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“Signature Event Context” and Speech Act Theory 
 
n the conveyance of meaning, communication is thought of as the 
exchange of information between two or more individuals, in which 
meaning is appropriated through a system of communication that conveys 
the intention of both parties.  Communication in its basic sense could be as 
simple as a gesture or a series of bodily movements that are meaningful, not 
only to the manifestator, but also to the recipients.  In order for this to happen, 
such gestures or manifestations of intentions to “communicate” must in 
themselves be always already given to both the manifestator and the recipients.  
In other words convention makes it possible for communication to occur, for 
in the manifestation of a “sign” or “meaning” towards an other, the 
manifestator makes use of a system that allows an other to decipher its 
intention to “communicate,” for in its failure to make a gesture or a 
manifestation to be understandable or mentally “legible,” the whole process of 
communication defeats its own purpose.  Thus, a bank robber, for example, 
will not drop down his pants to signal his surrender when cornered by the 
police,1 rather he will raise his arms up to the sky to “show” the absence of 
resistance in his countenance.  But what made it a convention or a “tradition” 
for people to raise their hands up as a signifier for “surrender” instead of 
dropping down one’s pants?   
In the advent of communication, Derrida finds that meaning through 
signification carries with it the possibility of mis-communication2 in which the 
intended meaning behind the text becomes undecidable and inevitably 
polysemic in its transference.  In a short, yet fecund essay “Signature Event 
Context,” Derrida tackles the problem of communication and the supposed 
claim of the classical notion of writing’s conception of virtual permanence 
within the text.3  The classical notion of writing claims that writing as a 
medium or a species of communication4 implies that the transference of 
                                                 
1 Perhaps his underwear was white, signaling his surrender to the police. 
2 Cf. Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., trans. by S. Weber and J. Mehlman (Evanston 
Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 156-157 [note 9 for Limited Inc.  a b c]. 
3 Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” in Limited Inc., 9.  See also Jacques Derrida, 
Margins of Philosophy, trans. by A. Bass (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982), 314. 
4 Ibid., 6. 
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meaning is conducted in a homogenous fashion.  In the absence,5 of the author 
who has abandoned the fleeting singular instance of inscription, the text, 
according to the classical notion of writing, must be able to transfer meaning 
within the interplay of the text itself, for if it fails to do so, writing would cease 
to become useful in its intention to transfer meaning.    
Derrida takes advantage of this context as a way of further elaborating 
his notion of polysemia and dissemination, and from this he deconstructs J.L.   
Austin’s Speech Act Theory found in the latter’s work How To Do Things With 
Words6 in order to demonstrate that writing (or representation in a general 
context) carries with it the constant possibility of polysemia through dissemination.  
Derrida claims that in spite of Austin’s new7 classification of the notion of 
communication, Austin’s "speech act theory” shares the same problems that 
have plagued the classical notion of writing.  Like Derrida’s criticism of the 
metaphysics of presence, Austin shares the same concern of moving away from 
the strict systematization of language as a fixed structure that is supposedly 
hierarchical in a sense that language becomes an unalterable domain of 
meaning in which its users simply “borrowed” or “used” such always already 
accessible tool.8 Austin explores an apparently neglected, though obvious, 
means of communication that goes beyond the traditional expression of truth 
or falsity as an adequation.  It is in Austin’s speech act theory that one finds 
words as a manifestation of an effect rather than the conveyance of truth or 
falsity in the traditional sense of prepositional logic.   
Austin, in this regard, explores the nature of locution as a performative, 
in which for him, most grammarians have failed to acknowledge and only 
                                                 
5 To note, Derrida pays a significant attention on this term through this essay.  Derrida 
inherits this through his reading of Condillac’s in which the notion of the trace is found to be 
congruent with Derrida’s earlier discussion on Of Grammatology. 
6  Cf. J.L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, ed. by J.O. Urmson and Marina Sbisà 
(London, Oxford University Press, 1975).  
7 Derrida emphasizes that by moving away from the traditional notion of locution or 
proposition making, Austin is able to explore a different manifestation of representations not as 
a conveyance of truth or falsity, but rather on the production of an effect or impulse towards an 
other: “. . .This category of communication is relatively new.  Austin’s notions of illocution and 
perlocution do not designate the transference or passage of a thought-content, but, in some way 
the communication of an original movement, an operation and the production of an effect.” 
Derrida, Limited Inc., 13. 
8 Arguing in the same vein as Derrida’s deconstruction would, Austin thinks that the 
dogmatic idealization of statements as “verifiable” from its origin has created a variety of non-
sensical statements that merely produced an unending chain of intellectual masturbations.  He 
finds the fault to be existing within those who were supposed to be responsible for overcoming 
such fault: “But now in recent years, many things which would once have been accepted without 
question as ‘statements’ by both philosophers and grammarians have been scrutinized with new 
care.  This scrutiny arose somewhat in-directly – at least in philosophy.  First came the view, not 
always formulated without unfortunate dogmatism, that a statement (of fact) ought to be 
‘verifiable,’ and this led to the view that many ‘statements’ are only what may be called pseudo-
statements.  First and most obviously, many ‘statements’ were shown to be, as Kant perhaps first 
argued systematically, strictly nonsense, despite an unexceptionable grammatical form: and the 
continual discovery of fresh types of nonsense, unsystematic though their classification and 
mysterious though their explanation is too often allowed to remain, has done on the whole 
nothing but good.” Austin, How to Do Things With Words, 2.  
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incidentally discussed by philosophers.9 Performatives are statements that do 
not convey the actual transference of “existing” and verifiable entities or beings 
by a speaker or an author, rather, performatives are considered to be futural 
claims of presence or, simply put, promises10 intended to bring a particular effect 
towards its recipient.  Austin notes the two simple description of what a 
performative is: 
 
A.  They do not describe or ‘report’ or constate anything 
at all, are not ‘true or false’; and 
The uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing 
of an action, which again would not normally be described 
as, or ‘just’ saying something.11 
  
Austin uses a variety of examples to demonstrate the activity that takes 
place in the utterance of a performative, one of which involves the utterance of 
a bet in which the futural activity of paying the winner of the bet becomes the 
performance of the statement.12 For example, one may utter “I bet my entire 
collection of vintage Gibson Les Pauls that you would not be able to 
successfully defend your thesis this March,” the utterance here does not 
actually take place, not until the condition of the bet is met.  In other words, 
the presence of the act of surrendering or not surrendering the set of vintage 
guitars is only acted upon the fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the condition, 
which is to fail or not to fail the thesis defense on March.  The statement is of 
course not something that is signified from an empirical or extra-mental reality; 
rather it is a statement that promises presence through the effect of a future 
performance.   
To note, Derrida finds Austin’s thoughts to be an interesting 
divergence from logocentrism on the account that communication no longer 
focuses on the referentiality of the object of what is communicated, but rather 
on the effect of what is being uttered.  However, in the course of Derrida’s 
essay, Derrida still finds Austin guilty of committing the very same logocentric 
tendencies that Austin has been trying or at least, seems to be avoiding.   
Logocentrism, as far as Derrida is concerned in the context of presence and 
representation, is the belief that the signified remains fixed and constant so that 
in its referral via a signifier, the text remains the same in repetition.  In Austin, 
this problem manifests itself in his belief that a ‘grand’ or a ‘total context’ 
determines the success of performatives.  This context determines the felicity or 
the infelicity of a particular speech act.  Felicity occurs as the fulfillment of the 
promise or the performance of the performatives, in other words, in its claims of 
a futural possibility of presence (Jouissance), felicity happens as a result of making 
something present within the consciousness of its recipient, with the hopes of 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 4. 
10 Ibid., 6-7. 
11 Ibid., 5. 
12 Ibid., 7.  
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effecting an intended effect on its receiver.  The fulfillment of such, for Austin 
is fulfilled within a specific circumstance or context that determines the possibility 
of performance.13 The assumption for this however, is that the individuals 
involved in the act of uttering a performative appropriates a fixed intention or 
the value of what is being communicated.  Derrida notes this problem in Austin: 
 
And yet – such at least is what I should like to attempt to 
indicate now – all the difficulties encountered by Austin 
in an analysis which is patient, open, aporetical, in 
constant transformation, often more fruitful in the 
acknowledgment of its impasses than in its positions, 
strike me as having a common root.  Austin has not taken 
account of what – in the structure of locution  (thus before 
any illocutory or perlocutory determined) – already entails 
that system of predicates I call graphematic in general and 
consequently blurs [brouille] all the oppositions which 
follow, oppositions whose pertinence, purity and rigor 
Austin has unsuccessfully attempted to establish.14 
 
For Derrida, Austin seems to be unable to establish the necessary 
distinctions in his speech act theory because he fails to establish the conditional 
possibilities of appropriation within utterances or texts.  In a simpler way, 
Derrida thinks that Austin’s version of the speech act theory is riddled with 
problems because it does not take into account the fact that performatives are 
still utterances that require referentiality, not only to empirical entities, but 
rather also to extramental phenomena at work in the intention of a conscious 
subject.  Moreover, Derrida finds that Austin is trying to isolate utterances that 
do not conform to an overarching context or convention in which statements 
mean something with precision.15  Austin aptly calls these phenomena as 
instances of the parasitical16 use of language, in which the use of words and 
utterances are faced with the risk of falling prey to.   
The focus of Derrida’s criticism of Austin is based on the assertion 
that the repeatability of a text or an utterance is always situated with the 
possibility of misappropriation as its constant structure.  I think that the 
intention of Derrida is not entirely to disrupt or efface Austin’s speech act 
theory, but rather to improve it by adding to it the possibility of polysemia and 
                                                 
13 “The uttering of the words is, indeed, usually a, or even the, leading incident in the 
performance of the act, the performance of which is also the object of the utterance, but is far 
from being usually, even if it is ever, the sole thing necessary if the act is to be deemed to have 
been performed.  Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the 
words are uttered should be in some way, or ways,  appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary 
that either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether 
‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or even acts of uttering further words.” Ibid., 8. 
14 Derrida, Limited Inc., 14. 
15 Ibid., 16. 
16 Austin, How to Do Things With Words, 22.  
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dissemination in the course of determining felicities and infelicities in an utterance.  
However, in this attempt, Derrida meets some resistance from one of Austin’s 
students, John Searle.  With the exclusion of the complete copy of Searle’s 
reply to Derrida,17 the entire debate is documented, albeit favoring Derrida’s 
side, in Limited Inc.  Searle argues that in the deconstruction of Austin speech 
act theory, Derrida seems to have made a mis18-interpretation of Austin’s 
intention of segregating the parasitic use of language as a metaphysical 
exclusion.19 Derrida is said to be rendering an illegitimate or an unrecognizable 
version of the speech act theory because he did not perceive Austin’s intention 
of establishing a parasitic discourse as a mere “relation of logical dependence”20 
and not as a derogatory remark towards the dysfunction of language.  Searle 
further argues that Derrida’s notion of writing as a model of iterability 
(repetition), fails to establish graphematics21 due to its logical dependence 
towards writing as “a contingent fact about the history of human languages.”22 
Searle states that since both “speakers and hearers” are both masters of the 
languages that they speak in a particular context, the problem of absence in 
writing is not problematical in the iterability of language because the rules of 
language in which they have acquired mastery from “allow[s] for the repeated 
application of the same rule.”23  
The debate, however, could be concluded as a draw, for one may 
argue on both sides while retaining the same results of Derrida and Searle’s 
arguments.  In Kevin Halion’s Dissertation, Deconstruction and Speech Act Theory: 
A Defense of the Distinction Between Normal and Parasitic Speech Acts, Derrida and 
Searle’s positions are resolved through the contextualization of their works.24 
Halion’s reading of Derrida and Searle makes it apparent that their positions 
are defensible with each other’s notion of the speech act theory and its 
underlying difficulties of iteration.25 Whereas Derrida would show that the 
problem of iteration carries with it the problem of the fluctuation of language, 
Searle shows that the possibility in of the occurrence of this problem is only 
upon the context of the fluctuations of space and time.  It is not to say that 
Derrida is against the impossibility of meaning, but rather on the absolute 
congruence of its transference from the utterer to its hearer.  It is in this regard 
                                                 
17 John Searle, “Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida,” in Glyph, 1 (1997), 
198-208. 
18 In deference to Derrida, I am pre-empting the usage of the word “mis” as an 
emphasis for later discussions that would best explain this unconventional divergence.   
19 Searle, Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida, 205. 
20 Ibid.   
21 The system of writing as a mode or species of communication. 
22 Ibid., 207. 
23 Ibid., 208. 
24 Kevin Halion, “Deconstruction and Speech Act Theory: A Defense of the 
Distinction Between Normal and Parasitical Speech Acts,” in   
<http://www.kkhec.ac.ir/Linguistics%20articles%20index/Deconstruction%20and%20Speech
%20Act%20Theory%20-%20Austin,%20Derrida,%20Sear.htm>, Accessed on December 18, 
2009. 
25 Ibid.    
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that Halion was able to prove that the distinction between the normal and 
parasitical usage of language could be resolved within Searle and Derrida’s 
texts.26 Ironically, the debate is prolonged only because Derrida and Searle have 
mis-contextualized the intentions of their critique of Austin. 
Using this fecund debate as a starting point, I intend to elevate 
Derrida’s notion of logocentrism, not merely as a metaphysical etiolation27 of 
presence, but as an explanation of how it is able to establish the congruency of 
the representation of a singularity found in the intention of an author and that 
of its interlocutor.  The ensuing discussion will revolve around the rubrics of 
the speech act theory (from Austin and Searle) as a supplement to Derrida’s 
deconstruction.  I will also demonstrate the possibility of logocentrism as an 
imperative of communication without denying Derrida’s critique of the 
metaphysics of presence.  In other words, I will show that Derrida’s 
deconstruction of logocentrism utilizes logocentrism itself as a context for its 
operation in the reading and writing of a text. 
 
The Parasite of Logos: Différance 
 
The dispute or the so-called “debate” that has occurred and transpired 
between Derrida and Searle involves the problem of iterability of a speech act, 
particularly within the process of the text’s repetition within the consciousness 
of the other.  Central to this debate is Austin’s notion of iterability as the 
fulfillment of speech act, which in turn creates felicities and infelicities28 as an 
effect of its utterance.29 Austin, in discussing the axioms involved in the 
occurrence of felicities and infelicities, spoke of the possibility in which they 
are fulfilled and not fulfilled in the context of parasitism as an utterance that 
makes use of non-conventional language in special circumstances:  
 
. . .a performative utterance will, for example, be in  a 
peculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, 
or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in a soliloquy.  This 
applies in a similar manner to any and utterance – a sea-
change in special circumstances.  Language in such 
circumstances is in special ways – intelligibly – used not 
seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use – ways 
which fall under the doctrine of the etiolations [non-
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Etiolation implies the disfunction of a plant that has lost its vigor due to the lack of 
sunlight or nutrients.  Austin is credited for the use of this term. 
28 It is interesting to note that in Austin, felicities and infelicities resembles Derrida’s 
usage of the word Jouissance, whereas a felicity would incur the fulfillment of a “presence” in an 
other’s consciousness, while its counterpart presents the inability of the other to make a speech 
act present in its own consciousness, thus producing the effect of a failed or an unhappy non-
presence. 
29 Austin, How to Do Things With Words, 14-15.  
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structural, unconventional, or unnatural] of language.  All 
this we are excluding from consideration.30 
 
Austin considers this non-conventional use of language as parasitical in 
so far as it is prone to create misfires31 in the fulfillment of performatives, and 
would then be subjected to the recurrence of further infelicities.  One may take 
for example, the idea of using poetry to settle cases in court, whereas the 
language itself may present the problem of accuracy and convention, to which 
most courts would find confusing and even unintelligible.  Let us say 
hypothetically, that a lawyer-poet, tries to defend his client, a male proctologist, 
from the accusation of raping another male client under his diagnosis: 
 
To the other man’s abyss 
My client tried to see 
In his disraughtful spelunking 
Only did he see 
The impetus of breaching 
This conatus that is not open to you and me 
Chamber maiden! Uttered he 
Please help this man from struggling! 
As I insert this Odysseus inside he 
Of the one who has 
A mysterious inhabitant in his ass32 
 
As opposed to the use of “normal” or default language, this defense 
leaves plenty for the imagination to the point that it obscures the meaning or the 
intention behind the “statement.” Thus, instead of performing its intended 
goal, the lawyer-poet obfuscates the meaning of his utterance to the point of 
inviting infelicities to infiltrate his statement.  Though the intention of this 
imaginary lawyer-poet demonstrates the problem that occurs within an 
utterance, which Derrida aims to shed light on through a deconstructive 
reading of Austin. 
When Austin makes the distinction between parasitical  and non-
parasitical as a distinction between the normal uses of language and the etiolated 
uses of language, he already makes a claim that there is a natural structure that 
governs all forms of locutions, and it is in this claim that Derrida bases his 
critique.  Derrida playfully considers Austin’s distinction to be a possible risk in 
which language is subjected as a constant possibility.33  In Dissemination, he shows 
that the re-presentation of presence becomes entangled with the subjectivity of 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 22 [My interpolation]. 
31 Ibid., 25. 
32 This poem is my own composition. 
33 Derrida, Limited Inc., 17.  
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an author that is absent from the work.34 Austin’s attempt to mend this 
problem is noted by Derrida with some admiration,35 for Austin’s gesture of 
acknowledging the problems that haunts his analysis of speech act theory 
already opens a fruitful, if not a lengthy, possibility of investigating the 
functions and limitations of language as graphematics.36 The risks however, must 
be explicitly stated as a problem of congruency rather than that of identity.  For 
in order to speak of language as a system that signifies an exact signified, one must 
first prove that all utterances are understood exactly as its speaker originally 
intended it to be.  For Stanley Fish, Austin’s strategy is quite similar to 
Derrida’s double gesture, for in stating an axiom, Austin is quick enough to set the 
margins of that axiom by reconceiving the very axiom that he has stated from the 
beginning of his previous lecture,37 and it is in this gesture that Austin is able to 
tease out, much like deconstruction, the limitations in which his axioms are 
applied.   
With the exception of Austin’s isolation of parasitical speech acts as an 
etiolation of language, Derrida’s position on the repeatability of utterances or 
texts is very much compatible with Austin’s notion of writing.  For Derrida, 
writing is the radical absence of presence, in which the origin or the source of the 
text is put into question with regards to its similarities and differences from the 
possible and extractable ‘meanings’ in the structure of the text.  In Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s distinction between speech and writing, Derrida is able to point 
out that writing and speech bear similar absences, for despite the immediacy of 
speech in transferring meaning towards its receiver, the receiver is still set back 
with the problem of decoding the intention of its speaker.  Thus, in this sense, 
speech, just like writing, faces the problem of overcoming the absence of 
presence, in the sense that presence becomes simulated and at the same time 
dissimulated by the obviousness of the signified’s not-being-there in the text.  In 
this radical absence of presence, language (speech and writing) replaces 
presence as a supplement for its inability to take scene as it was in the 
consciousness of an other.  One may say that language is similar to the news 
that is read in the papers or seen in the television, one does not need to be there 
to actually know what took place in a particular event.  Language similarly 
functions in this way, it does not really need to point or to signify an actual 
presence in order for its intended effect to manifest; in fact, it is the very nature 
                                                 
34 This allusion is rendered fictionally in his reading of Mallarme’s mimodrama, wherein 
the repetition or the miming of the scene becomes altered according to the mime’s understanding 
of the scene. Cf. Jacques Derrida, Dissemination,  trans. by B. Johnson (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981). 
35 “. . . all the difficulties encountered by Austin in an analysis which is patient, open, 
aporetical, in constant transformation, often more fruitful in the acknowledgment of its impasses 
than in its positions, strike me as having a common root.” Derrida, Limited Inc.,  14 
36 Graphematics refers to a system of representation or signfication, Derrida would 
refer to this as Grammatology in his similarly entitled work. 
37 Cf. Stanley E.  Fish, With the Compliments of the Author: Reflections on Austin and Derrida, 
Jacques Derrida, vol. 2, ed. by Christopher Norris and David Roden (London: SAGE 
Publications, Ltd., 2003), 205-233.  See Also, Critical Inquiry, 8 (1982), 693-721.  
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of language in which literature finds itself anchored in, the supplementary or 
the pharmakonian nature of language.   
For Austin, the possibility of the fulfillment of the performative 
function of a speech act lies within context itself38, for it governs the necessary 
circumstances in which a speech act is to be understood and performed 
according to the intention of its speaker.   One cannot, for example, baptize a 
crocodile or pronounce a biological brother and sister as married, for the 
conditions and performance of these rituals already implies their individual 
context in which an utterance operate in order for a performance to function.  
Thus, in baptizing a crocodile, one fails to fulfill the condition that the one 
who would be baptized must be a person, or in the case of marrying a biological 
brother and sister, the context becomes null and void because it involves a 
contradiction of the system of its ceremony because the act itself is considered 
incestuous.  Austin uses a wide variety of interesting examples, which are often 
humorous and at the same time demonstrative, and in these examples one can 
see the underlying importance of context in the manifestation of a 
performative.  These conditions are for Derrida, prone to polysemia, whereas 
the variability of the recurrence or the repetition of the context is subject to 
circumstantial modification, and the consistency of which is always at the risk 
of diverging from its ideal context.  A priest, for example, may find himself in a 
situation in which wine becomes unavailable for his congregation (for the 
sacrament of communion), and instead finds a keg of brandy delivered to his 
church by mistake.  Is the priest unable to perform the sacrament of 
communion? Or is he allowed to modify the context so as to fulfill the 
performance of the sacrament despite this small contextual inconvenience? 
The situation could even go to the length of absurdity, in which small 
contextual details become replaced by larger ones, to the extent that 
performances would inevitably breach the domain of ethics and axiology. 
But to go to the heart of the argument, Derrida situates the speech act 
theory in the context of writing and poses the question of the possibility of a 
homogenized discourse of communication and the possibility of its transference 
of meaning39.  He sets the context of his essay, “Signature Event Context,” on 
the premise that writing is able to demonstrate radical absence better than 
speech.40 The problem that Derrida poses against Austin is the relative claim of 
context in which communication is situated in, and because of the absence of 
                                                 
38 “. . . Speaking generally, it is always necessary that the circumstances in which the 
words are uttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and it is very commonly necessary 
that either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether 
‘physical’ or ‘mental’ actions or even acts of uttering further words.” Austin, How To Do Things 
With Words, 8. 
39 Derrida, Limited Inc., 3. 
40 Because of the intentional and unintentional probability of an absent recipient in 
writing, writing becomes a simpler way of conveying the problem of language as a system of 
communication and representation that simulates and dissimulates presence.  One might as well 
consider Derrida’s referral to writing as synonymous to speech for Derrida considers both as 
similar with regards to the problem of absence implied within its system.  
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an author in writing, context becomes problematic in so far as the author is 
writing for someone who is not yet present before him: 
 
What holds for the receiver holds also, for the same 
reasons, for the sender or the producer.  To write is to 
produce a mark that will constitute a sort of machine 
which is productive in turn, and which my future 
disappearance will not, in principle, hinder its functioning, 
offering things and itself to be read and to be rewritten.  
When I say “my future disappearance,” it is in order to 
render this proposition more immediately acceptable.  I 
ought to be able to say my disappearance, pure and 
simple, my nonpresence in general, for instance the 
nonpresence of my intention of saying something 
meaningful, of my wish to communicate, from the 
emission or production of the mark.  For a writing to be a 
writing it must continue to “act” and to be readable even 
when what is called the author of the writing no longer 
answers for what he has written, for what he seems to 
have signed .  .  ..41 
 
Writing then (in Derrida’s context, which involves any system of 
graphematics or representation) is inherently dependent on the repeatability of 
context, for the success of a text’s performance is dependent on the unknown 
or undeterminable recipient’s ability to synchronize intentions with its sender.  
The problem that the speech act theory faces, is the repeatability or the 
iterability of the text or utterance, for in the repetition of a statement or a 
performative, one faces the problem of equivocation and ambiguity, which 
Austin finds necessary to clarify and recontextualize.42 Explicitness, for Austin, 
is problematic, and one needs to express statements with clarity in order to 
overcome the problem of equivocation43.   
The problem however, for Derrida, is that explicitness does not always 
lend itself to a perfect appropriation of the author or the speaker’s intention, and 
even under the conditions of an elaborate explicitness, which can be seen 
inside Austin’s own work,44 the intention to say something is always at the risk 
                                                 
41 Derrida, Limited Inc., 8. 
42 Austin, How to Do Things With Words, 72. 
43 Austin would go as far as suggesting explicitness as a way of avoiding equivocal 
statements like single word statements, for example, instead of saying “suck,” despite of the 
immediate context of the situation, one might explicitly say, “I order you to suck on this lemon 
after you drink a shot of tequila.”  Cf. ibid., 73.  
44 This is perhaps why Derrida lauds Austin for the honesty and method of his 
writing.  For example, in his attempt to distinguish performative utterances from constative 
utterances, Austin admits the fact that to some extent, his explication of explicitness is riddled 
with obscurities, and cautions his readers to take note of the complication involved in the 
distinction itself, perhaps even Austin himself also writes under erasure. Ibid., 67-71.   
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of a possible infelicity.  Convention then becomes questionable, in as far as it is 
always at risk, it would always involve the possibility of unintentionally creating 
infelicities.45 Derrida notes the discrepancies in Austin’s isolation of parasitism 
and the possibility that it incurs infelicities: 
 
1) that Austin, at this juncture, appears to consider solely 
the conventionality constituting the circumstance of the 
utterance [énoncé], its contextual surroundings, and not a 
certain conventionality intrinsic to what constitutes the 
speech act [locution] itself, all that might be summarized 
rapidly under the problematical rubric of the “arbitrary 
nature of the sign,” which extends, aggravates, and 
radicalizes the difficulty.  “Ritual” is not a possible 
occurrence [éventualité], but rather, as  iterability, a 
structural characteristic of every mark. 
2) that the value of risk or exposure to infelicity, even 
though, as Austin recognizes, it can affect a priori the 
totality of conventional acts, is not interrogated as an 
essential predicate or as a law.  Austin does not ponder 
the consequences issuing from the fact that a possibility – 
a possible risk – is always possible, and is in some sense a 
necessary possibility.  Nor whether – once such a 
necessary possibility of infelicity is recognized – infelicity 
still constitutes an accident.  What is a success when the 
possibility of infelicity [échec] continues to constitute its 
structure?46 
 
Considering Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence in the 
history of Western ontology, this problem has already been thought of in 
various contexts involving mainly thinkers of Continental-European 
orientation.   Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas, for example, point out that the 
subjectivity of an individual is unique to the extent that it affects the possibility 
of meaning, and, in turn, creates differences.  The risk, for Derrida, is important 
to the extent that, for him, it governs the possibility of transferring meaning to 
an other, and in relation to his earlier critique of metaphysics, one can then say 
that Austin’s conception of context is blatantly logocentric. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Austin is evidently aware of this problem to the point that he maps out the 
scenarios in which one would incur the possibility of infelicities, but only to the point that he is 
able to demonstrate the possibility of avoiding misfires and not considering them occurring even 
within a successful occurrence of a performative. Ibid., 18-20. 
46 Derrida, Limited Inc., 15.  
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Searle, Intentionality, and the Speech Act Theory 
 
Incidentally, it is in this critique of the speech act theory that one could 
find Derrida supporting, or at least, affirming logocentrism as a conditio sine qua 
non of the possibility of the transference of meaning, but only to the extent that 
it should be taken as a limited context that refers to the traces of singularity left 
at the moment of the inscription or utterance of a text.  This is partially made 
possible by Searle’s reply to Derrida’s essay, which is a defense of his 
interpretation of Austin from Derrida’s deconstruction of the speech act 
theory.  Searle’s argument against Derrida is that the conscious state of 
intentionality itself determines the economy of transaction within the speaker 
and receiver;47 intentions then, plays an important role in determining the 
success of a peformative in the transaction of meaning that occurs between the 
speaker and the receiver.  For Searle, intention is able to allay the possibility of 
infelicities through the explicitness of the intention of the speaker/author; he 
uses, for example, an imaginary hypothetical American soldier captured by 
Italian soldiers in the Second World War as an example of the explicitness of 
intention.  The captured American soldier, in his attempt to avoid 
imprisonment, tries to speak German in order to fool the Italians, but the 
problem is that he only knows bits of German from a song, “Kennst du das Land 
wo die Zitronen blühen?” which when translated roughly asks: “Knowest thou the 
land where the lemon trees bloom?”48 For Searle, the situation in which the 
speech act is uttered already determines the explicitness of the intention of the 
soldier to fool the Italians that he was German, and even if the American 
soldier specifically utters in German “Ich bin ein deutscher soldat” (I am a German 
soldier), the effect of the intention would still reach the Italian soldiers given in 
this condition49.  Whether the Italian soldiers understand what the American 
soldier is saying or not, the mere fact of speaking German already necessitates 
the success of the performative,50 which taken semantically, does not make any 
pertinent sense towards its recipient, the fact that the speaker shows his 
intention that he can speak German already determines the success of the 
speech act.  The inability then, to speak German coherently, for Searle, 
becomes a mere circumstantial convention51 in which the Italians may overlook 
simply because they do not really understand what the soldier was saying.   
Searle makes two distinctions in which the context of intention is set 
in a speech act, he states that there are two kinds of facts that govern the 
transference of meaning in an utterance, one of which is the brute fact and the 
                                                 
47 Searle, Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida, 202. 
48 John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969), 44-45. 
49 It is interesting to note that Searle has given this example under the note that certain 
conditions are met, such as the knowledge that the captors (Italian soldiers) know that there are 
German soldiers wearing American uniforms, have orders from their generals to release any 
German soldiers, that the captors do not know how to speak German, etc. Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 45.  
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other is the institutional fact.52  Brute facts are the easily and obviously 
acknowledged facts that are empirically validated through sense experience,53 such 
as “this stone is next to that stone,” “Bodies attract with a force inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between them and directly 
proportional to the product of their mass,” or “I have a pain.”54 For Searle, 
these facts are directly modeled after the natural sciences,55 which, later on, he 
considers as a redundant assertion that does not need to be stated for their 
existence.56 On the other hand, institutional facts, are facts that exists in so far as 
human convention has made it possible,57 for example, conventions such as 
marriage, winning a football game, or watching a documentary about America 
from a Kazakhstanian reporter, are facts that occur only because of its being 
conditioned by societal normative practices.  These facts, for Searle, is what 
makes a speech act function in its process of conveying meaning, and it is in 
this regard that the homogeneity of meaning is preserved, primarily because 
these facts are accessible to language speakers, and thus allow the survival of an 
intention of an utterance or writing of the text in so far as the intention to 
communicate is based on the context of the speaker’s (or writer’s) situation.58 
The problems that Derrida poses to Austin’s version of the speech act 
theory is, for Searle, a misunderstanding  of Austin’s research strategy.  The 
exclusion of parasitic from non-parasitic discourses is not a way of 
marginalizing particular discourses with the intention of creating ethical 
valuation,59 Searle maintains that the term “parasitic” in Austin’s speech act 
theory is a way of distinguishing the standard form of discourse from its non-
standard usage (i.e.  in fiction),60 which enables a distinction from the logical 
truth of language as evidenced by the history of human languages itself.61 
Furthermore, the problems that Derrida poses towards the iterability and the 
repeatability of statements and utterances deviates from the original structure 
of language since “the speaker and hearers are masters of the sets of rules we 
call the rules of language, and these rules are recursive” and that “they allow 
for the repeated application of the same rule.”62 Searle thinks then that there is 
no conflict between the iterability of language and the intention63 of the 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 50. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid.   
56 To note, Searle finds the obviousness behind brute facts as an already given fact in 
the world, and it is only in special cases (i.e. teaching students physics, explaining to a child why 
the sun rises up from the east, etc.) wherein the re-assertion of these facts are to be considered 
logical. Ibid., 141. 
57 Ibid., 51. 
58 Searle, Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida, 200. 
59 Ibid., 205. 
60 Ibid., 207. 
61 Ibid.   
62 Ibid., 208. 
63 Ibid.    
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speaker, precisely because it is an always already given situation for language to 
be, and to some extent, one might conclude that Searle is accusing Derrida of 
committing the fallacy of assertion,64 which for Searle is the analysis of a 
linguistic situation that confuses the condition of “making non-defective 
assertions with the conditions of the applicability of certain concepts.”65  
These accusations are more or less provocative for Derrida, for in 
claiming that there is a “right” way of interpreting Austin, which involves the 
“right” way of using language, Searle is already implying that these differences 
are not important determinants of language, and that all speech acts follow an 
originary set of rules that enable absolute homogeneity with regard to the 
context of speech acts.  This accusation results into a comprehensive polemic 
which takes Searle’s statements word for word--as a justification that Searle has 
misunderstood Derrida and Austin--in as much as Searle is accusing Derrida of 
misunderstanding Austin.   
 
The Limits of Difference: The Eccentric Center of 
Logocentrism in the Iterability of the Text 
 
In “Limited Inc. a b c…,”66 Derrida answers Searle’s accusation of 
misreading Austin by engaging Searle in a very explicit debate regarding the 
necessity of excluding parasitism in Austin’s speech act theory.  Derrida’s 
rebuttal is long, sarcastic, ironic, and humorous, for it involves the reversal of 
Searle’s position through these gestures as a way of making his points explicit.  
The title of the essay itself, already lends clues to its readers that this polemic is 
intended towards the exploration of the limitations in which context allows 
iterability to function.  The position that Searle took in his argument against 
Derrida, finds notable similarities with the classical notion of representation, 
which is mimetic.  This is not only exclusive to Searle, but also to that of Austin, 
which according to Derrida, finds parasitism as a dismissible and coincidental in 
a sense that it does not belong essentially  to language67.  The difference, 
however, between Austin and Searle is that, Austin is aware of the limitations 
in which his analysis of language is situated, and it is noted by Derrida that the 
limitations within Austin’s speech act theory implies possibility as the boundary 
in which Austin’s axioms operate.  Searle, on the other hand, is adamant to 
consider  parasitism as a probable means of explication, and thus considers 
Derrida’s criticism to be missing out the explicit details of Austin’s method. 
To put it succinctly, Derrida’s polemic against Searle is based on his 
notion of différance, as the possibility and limitation of possibility in which 
context is constituted in communication.  Derrida maintains that iterability carries 
with it a sense of absence68 which was gravely misunderstood by Searle as 
                                                 
64 Searle, Speech Acts, 141. 
65 Ibid., 144. 
66  Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Limited Inc.  a b c. . .,” in Limited Inc. 
67 Derrida, “Signature Event Context,” in Ibid., 17. 
68 Derrida, Limited Inc., 47.  
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merely the “absence of an author” in a discourse.  In speaking of absence, 
Derrida intends to state that the intention of the author itself is tainted with 
imperfection as the entirety of the singularity of the inscription or the utterance of 
a performative is in itself lost  in such moment, thus, radical absence as 
conceived by Derrida implies the possibility of mis: 
 
. . .The relation of “mis” (mis-understanding, mis-
interpreting, for example) to that which is not “mis-,” is 
not at all that normality, of the “standard.” All that I 
recall is that this structural possibility must be taken into 
account when describing so-called ideal normality, or so-
called just comprehension or interpretation, and that this 
possibility can be neither excluded nor opposed.  An entirely 
different logic is called for.69 
 
For those who are in search of a logic, or a telos behind the intention of 
deconstruction to deconstruct, one might find this statement exacting, if not 
limiting.  The critique of the metaphysics of presence that Derrida conducts 
through his deconstructive readings bases its criticism on this lack of 
acknowledgement for the structural possibility of interruption and disruption, 
and thus it is precisely in this line of thought that deconstruction could 
sometimes be considered skeptical and at times nihilistic for it effaces the very 
foundation of the claim of a system (i.e. Saussure’s signifier/signified, Levi-
Strauss’ and Rousseau’s notion of purity, Levinas’ notion of infinity, Heidegger’s 
distinction between man  and animal, etc.) to have an ideally working set of 
distinctions between its inside and its outside, between its purity and its impurity, 
itself and its Other, etc.  The problem of linguistic systems that claims the 
possibility of an absolute repetition of a statement or utterance is that they 
usually fail to acknowledge that what is being repeated, mimed, copied, is not 
the same as its original. 
This, however, does not imply that it is impossible  to communicate 
meaning,70 for what is implied in the possibility of mis is that representation 
itself is imperfect, and mis as a constant standing possibility that plays itself within 
communication, implies a possibility and not an absolute condition of mis-
                                                 
69 Ibid., 157. 
70 Derrida, despite the speculation of his critics, does not deny the possibility of 
meaning in the texts, he merely points out how the text itself dissimulates its claims of presence, 
precisely because it refers to something that has passed away, or had become inaccessible in its entirety.  
One may find this affirmation in his notion of the trace, wherein the residues of an original 
presence, is still capable, to some degree, of reconstructing the lost presence.  Hence, Derrida’s 
discourse is always seemingly unconventional: “. . . deconstruction tries to show that the 
question of reference is much more complex and problematic than traditional theories supposed 
. . . But to distance oneself thus from the habitual structure of reference, to challenge or 
complicate our common assumptions about it, does not amount to saying that there is nothing 
beyond language.” Jacques Derrida, “Deconstruction and the Other”,  in  Dialogues with 
Contemporary Continental Thinkers, ed. by R. Kearney (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984), 124.   
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communication.  The text or utterance itself is, for Derrida, re-traceable, but 
retracing it, however, brings the discourse back to the inevitability of turning 
back to différance.  The text itself is a scattered remnant of its originary 
inception; hence, one will agree with Derrida that the meaning behind the text 
is essentially disseminated, and the only thing that keeps its meaning or gives the 
meaning behind the text the possibility of congruency with its interlocutor is its 
syntax.  Différance itself is a ontological concept that represents an actual 
occurrence within the economy of signs and representations, it is for him, not a 
nihilistic process of suspending meaning, but a creative play of differences that 
occurs as a consequence of the effort to hold back presence in its evanescent 
elusion.71 The mark that is left by différance is always already a mark that tells the 
difference, it is at the same time simulating and dissimulating its claims of 
presence in the gesture of signification: 
 
The iterability [repeatability] of the mark does not leave 
any of the philosophical oppositions which govern the 
idealizing abstraction (for instance, serious/non-serious, 
literal/metaphorical or sarcastic, ordinary/parasitical, 
strict/non-strict, etc.).  Iterability blurs a priori the 
dividing-line that passes between these opposed terms, 
“corrupting” if you like, contaminating it parasitically, qua 
limit.  What is re-markable about the mark includes the 
margin within the mark.  The line delineating the margin 
can therefore never be determined rigorously, it is never 
pure and simple.  The mark is re-markable in that it “is” 
also its margin.72 
 
In opposition to Searle’s position, the iterability of the mark, utterance, 
or the text is already dissimulated once it is communicated and with much 
sarcasm, Derrida states that it might have been possible that he had 
misinterpreted Austin in as much as Searle has misinterpreted Austin.73 
Moreover, Derrida pointed out that one of the major blunders in Searle’s 
reading of the Signature Event Context is the fact that three important points 
were left out in Searle’s analysis, mainly: (1) Signature, (2) Event, and (3) 
Context.74  
What is striking about this omission however is that Searle misses this 
unified explanation of Derrida’s elusive notion of différance, and it is in this three 
                                                 
71 “For us, différance remains a metaphysical name, and all the names that it receives in 
our language are still, as names, metaphysical.  And this is particularly the case when these names 
state the determination of différance as the difference between presence and the resent, and above 
all, and is already the case when they state the determination of différance as the difference of 
Being and beings.” Derrida, Margins of Philosohpy, 26. 
72 Derrida, Limited Inc., 70 [my own interpolation]. 
73 Ibid., 37. 
74 Ironically, Searle seems to have missed the entire point of the essay, the very title 
that is. Ibid., 46.  
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particular points that I find Derrida explicitly elaborating on these three points 
and its importance in the development of the ontology of différance.  Starting 
with signatures, Derrida opines that iteration, mimesis, and repetition should 
be taken as constitutive of inscription.  The signature is important for both 
Austin and Derrida75 in so far as it establishes the site of the construction of an 
utterance or writing.  The signature answers the question “who is it that speaks, 
or has written before me?” It allows the interlocutor to understand (in a limited 
fashion) the absence that the author has left for others to see, and in this case 
Derrida agrees with Austin, precisely because Austin admits to some extent 
that communication involves a radical form of absence.  The possibility of a 
rapprochement between Derrida and Austin should be articulated.  Austin 
explains this possibility of a radical absence in an utterance: 
 
The ‘I’ who is doing the action does thus come essentially 
into the picture.  An advantage of the original first person 
singular present indicative active form – or likewise of the 
second and third and impersonal passive forms with 
signature appended – is that this implicit feature of the 
speech-situation is made explicit.  More-over, the verbs 
which seem, on grounds of vocabulary, to be specially 
performative verbs serve the special purpose of making 
explicit (which is not the same as stating or describing) 
what precise action it is that is being performed by the 
issuing of the utterance: other words which seem to have 
a special performative function (and indeed have it), such 
as ‘guilty,’ ‘off-side,’ &c, do so because, in so far as and 
when they are linked in ‘origin’ with these special explicit 
performative verbs like ‘promise,’ ‘pronounce,’ ‘find,’ &c. 
. . .Thus what we should feel tempted to say is that any 
utterance which is in fact a performative should be 
reducible, or expandible, or analyzable into a form, or 
reproducible in a form, with a verb in the first person 
singular present indicative active (grammatical).76 
 
To note, Derrida does not only find the mention of the singular present 
indicative active form to be a precise description of the tenses used in an utterance, 
it also serves, for him, as an explicit description of the activity occurring at the 
instance of utterance and writing itself: 
 
By definition, a written signature implies the actual or 
empirical nonpresence of the signifier.  But, it will be 
claimed, the signature also marks and retains his having-
been present in a past now or present [maintenant] which 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 19. 
76 Austin, How to Do Things With Words, 61-62.  
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will remain a future now or present [maintenant], thus in a 
general  maintenant, in the transcendental form of 
presentness [maintainance].  That general maintenance is in 
some way inscribed, pinpointed in the always evident and 
singular present punctuality of the form of the signature.  
Such is the enigmatic originality of every paraph.  In order 
for the tethering to the source to occur, what must be 
retained is the absolute singularity of a signature-event, 
and a signature-form: the pure reproducibility of a pure 
event.77 
 
Signatures in their iteration imply singularity, which, in turn, affirms 
the condition that it is what it is and at the same time it is what it is not.  In 
inscribing a signature, one affirms the condition that it is done in the present 
with the anticipation that the presence in its inscription will no longer be 
present.  In other words, signatures express that the absolute singularity who has 
been there in its inscription, is no longer present, and the trace that is there for 
someone or anyone who takes interest in the presence of an absent utterer or 
writer.  As Austin would note, inscribing a signature or the usage of present 
indicative active form of the pronoun “I” transforms an otherwise implicit 
utterance into an explicit one because it leaves traces of its context, inscribed 
within the actual occurrence of an event.  Thus in uttering the statement “That 
bull is dangerous!” the equivalent indication that an author or an utterer would 
leave in this singular instance of warning an other similarly appears like so: 
 
This bull is dangerous. 
            (Signed) John Jones.78 
 
The expression of singularity that Derrida’s essay, “Signature Event 
Context,” is based entirely on temporality, whereas instances are differentiated 
from another instance through the difference of its circumstance of its 
occurrence.  These differences, however, are not mutually excluded in  totality.  
Signatures, according to Derrida, demonstrate difference and ipseity in their 
iteration, the purity of their repeatability is always questionable, yet in the 
repetition of its inscription, the signatures itself retains its functions despite the 
differences that it incurs from the circumstance of its inscription.79  The 
assertion of this occurrence of différance is again, not a nihilistic approach of 
doing ontology through aporia,80 rather it is a creative process in which 
                                                 
77 Derrida, Limited Inc., 20. 
78 Austin, How to Do Things With Words, 62. 
79 Derrida, Limited Inc., 20. 
80 This is to take into account the classical sense of aporia as an irresolvable conflict 
between two contradicting statements (i.e.  All Cretans are Liars, and I am a Cretan).  Derrida 
develops elsewhere a positive concept of aporia that considers it as a logic of plurality rather than 
that of contradiction. Cf. Jacques Derrida, Aporias, trans. by Thomas Dutoit, (California: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), 20-21.  
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transformation takes place in ontology.  Différance does not mark the end of 
communication, rather, for Derrida, it opens new possibilities that are latent 
behind the text itself, and this is what he considers as an epoch of writing: 
 
As writing, communication, if we retain that word, is not 
the means of transference of meaning, the exchange of 
intentions and meanings, discourse and the 
“communication of consciousnesses.” We are witnessing 
not an end of writing that would restore, in accord with 
McLuhan’s ideological representation, a transparency or 
an immediacy to social relations; but rather the 
increasingly powerful historical expansion of a general 
writing, of which the system of speech and 
consciousness, meaning, presence, truth, etc., would be 
only an effect, and should be analyzed as such.  It is the 
exposure of this effect that I have called elsewhere 
logocentrism.81 
 
This reference to logocentrism, however, is a clarification of his earlier 
reference to onto-theology82, logocentrism in this context refers to a structure of 
reference that changes or sways within time.  The discussions made earlier 
prove the point that logocentrism operates within the context of différance; this 
is made apparent by Derrida’s position on iteration, particularly with signatures.  
What is made explicit however, in Derrida’s debate with Searle, is that the 
context or the circumstance in which the event of a speech act occurs, is always 
differing and yet at the same time, subscribing within the already given 
structure of language.  One should not perceive or think of logocentrism as an 
inherent problem of meaning, for in its operation, logocentrism immediately 
effaces itself through its grafting83 with another context, and through this the 
center in which the text refers itself to, trembles and in turn becomes an eccentric 
center that become a gateway for a future that has yet to come. 
 
The Possibility of Parasitical Symbiosis: Moving Beyond the 
Classical Concept of Writing 
 
To go back to Searle’s argument against Derrida, one must simply 
recall Derrida’s position against the classical concept of writing as a repetition 
of speech or even that of presence, and within this context one would be able to 
see that for Derrida, parasitism is symbiotic.  In what sense then does it become 
symbiotic and parasitic at the same time? Since writing already implies the 
                                                 
81 Ibid.    
82 Derrida, Of Grammatology, 12. 
83 This term connotes the transformation of the text as it becomes transplanted 
towards various contexts.  Derrida discusses this elaborately on both “Signature Event Context” 
and “Limited Inc.  a b c….” See Limited Inc., 12 and 80-82.  
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radical absence of a source, writing has been deemed evil, if not detrimental, 
towards the appropriation of presence.  To recall, however, the arguments that 
Derrida raised against this accusation, one can see that speech itself is a kind of 
writing.84 And to this extent, both are representations of representations, 
which, in other words, are parasites with regard to their consistent reference to 
presence.  Searle’s accusation of Derrida might be deemed parasitical in this sense: 
 
I believe he [Derrida] has misunderstood Austin in 
several crucial ways and the internal weakness in his 
argument are closely tied to these misunderstandings.  In 
this section therefore I will very briefly summarize his 
critique and then simply list the major misunderstandings 
and mistakes.85 
 
To Derrida’s ire, this statement demonstrates Searle’s 
misunderstanding of Derrida himself (perhaps due to his own ire) and, to note, 
Derrida undertakes this so-called “misunderstanding” as a continuation of 
Austin’s recognition of the limitation within his analysis of the speech act 
theory.86 The point here is that, in reading Derrida, Searle has already 
demonstrated the fact that context and intention can never be the perfect basis 
of establishing the success of uttering a performative, which, in Derrida, is not 
even possible.  Context itself, just like the signature, could never be repeated 
perfectly as it was conceived to be.   
Words itself offer a context, a limited one, that is, wherein the 
arrangement and syntax of texts provide a partial, if not, a total glimpse of the 
author’s intention.  In this way, one must conceive of writing, on one hand, as 
symbiotic to the intention of the author in as much as it enables its 
interlocutors to understand the text even in the radical absence (or death) of 
the author, and, on the other hand, can be deemed as parasitical in so far as it is 
unable to fully express the intention of the author,87 which in turn is to be 
considered as a relation of parasitism.  Parasitism itself, implies internality,88 
and to correct Searle (and perhaps even Austin), Derrida proposes a different 
way of looking at the phenomena of iterability or mimesis with regards to Searle’s 
version of context, a system of mimesis that acknowledges its own repetition 
of the logos as a different copy.89 Derrida corrects the traditional notion of the 
                                                 
84 Like writing, speech also involves the radical absence of presence, since the 
immediacy of meaning conveyed by speech is also necessitated by a gap between the “I” and the 
“Other” in their respective and irreducible singularities.  Speech then is a representation of a 
representation.   
85 Searle, “Reply to Derrida: Reiterating the Differences,” 203. 
86 Derrida, Limited Inc., 86-87. 
87 This misfires, as Austin would call it, is for Derrida is a problem of the conscious 
and unconscious within the intention of the utterer.  Derrida alludes to psychoanalysis, as a 
rebuttal towards Searle’s statement that “intentions must be conscious.” Ibid., 73-75. 
88 Ibid., 96-98. 
89 Ibid., 90.  
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logic of mimesis as différance.  To give more emphasis to this point, he claims 
that “there is no pure performative”90, precisely because the repetition of the 
utterance within the consciousness of the speaker is mediated by the 
consciousness of its recipient, and even if (to recall Searle) there is a system or 
an  overarching grand-recit of some kind that governs the standards of 
communication (i.e. grammar), this system is still prone to the possibility of 
parasitism primarily because of the differences in the unique plenitude of 
consciousnesses that would subscribe (and violate) to this constant context.  To 
write in line with Derrida’s gesture, I find that the opposition between parasitic 
and non-parasitic discourses is clarified, if a positive term is introduced within 
this paradigm.  Thus, in place of the “positive” opposite, I would prefer to use 
symbiosis as the “other” of parasitism.  The choice of this word comes with the 
intention of elevating this discourse into the possibility of integrating 
parasitism as a constant element of the speech act theory, rather than 
considering parasitism as an isolated or an accidental occurrence in an 
utterance.   
 One should then take the following questions in mind: Is there a way 
out of logocentrism? Is it possible to have a concurrence of meaning despite the 
deviations of parasitism? If not, where then do signs refer to if there is no fixed 
meaning? These questions would help one in understanding the entire 
proceeding of Derrida’s dealings with speech act theory; for in the course of 
his debate with Searle, différance becomes more or less obvious in their varying 
positions.  To conclude, I consider both Derrida and Searle to be logocentric, 
not that they had any choice to be otherwise, but only because the so-called 
“debate” or “confrontation” would not have been possible if neither of the 
two had focused their energies on Austin.  The logos would be there, always be 
there, but it would be only in preparation for those to come.  And in the 
coming of the others this logos becomes other than itself.  The search for an 
originary logos may perhaps end here and instead usher in a different 
understanding of what logocentrism is.  And in this fleeting moment wherein the 
center holds at the inscription of these words, the I would insist that différance 
and logocentrism be put together in an ouroboric activity of referring and differing. 
 
College of Accountancy, University of Santo Tomas, Philippines 
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